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Abstract: Government laws are not always consistent with the laws of supply and
demand and when enacted have unintended consequences. Three real world
examples provide illustrations of policy makers implementing policies that have
unintended consequences. When households and firms look at prices when deciding
what to buy and sell, they unknowingly take into account the social benefits and
costs of their actions. As a result, prices guide these individual decision makers to
reach outcomes that maximize the welfare of society as a whole.

Ronald Regan once quipped that if economists invented the game of trivial
pursuit it would have 1,000 questions and 3,000 answers. This is hardly fair on
the economics profession since most economists agree on most of the major
propositions in economics. A study by Richard M. Alstron, J.R. Kearl and Michael
B. Vaughan in the American economic Review (1992), and restated by Mankiew
(2001), concluded that there is widespread agreement among economists on, for
example, the impact of rent controls on the supply of housing, the effect on
economic welfare of tariff and import quotas, the effect of budgets deficits on the
macroeconomy, the effect of minimum wage laws on employment among young
and unskilled workers and the preference of marketable pollution permits in
controlling pollution over price ceilings.
According to the Harvard economist Gregory Mankiew (2001), economists have
two roles. As scientists they make observations and develop theories to explain
those observed behaviours in the world around them. Secondly, they act as
policy advisers using their theories to help governments make informed
decisions on policy. Of course, economists do offer conflicting advice to policy
makers because they will have different scientific judgments on alternative
theories about how the world works. For Mankiew, having different scientific
judgments is not something that is unique to the economics profession. After all,
up to quite recently, meteorologists differed on the extent of global warming (or
indeed if it was happening at all). Different views prevailed because they held
different scientific judgments on the evidence. Indeed, two hundred years ago
astronomers were split on the question as to whether the sun or the earth was at
the centre of the solar system.
However, the problem of economic theory is that policy makers tend to ignore it.
Three real world examples provide illustrations of policy makers implementing

policies that did not consider economists advice on the unintended
consequences of these policies.
Rent Control
Begg et al (2001) and Mankiew (2001) delineate the classic example of many
countries imposing rent controls, which limit the rent landlords, can charge their
tenants for rented accommodation. While the intended effect is laudable and
designed to make accommodation more affordable for the poor, the unintended
effects are quite the opposite. Initially the supply of rented accommodation is
insensitive (or, to use the economic term, inelastic) to the new price, which is
below the equilibrium rent. This is because in the short run landlords cannot put
their properties to alternative uses. In the short run therefore, the supply of
rented accommodation is not reduced significantly below the quantity supplied
at the market equilibrium rent. In the longer run the outcome is quite different.
Landlords will tend to sell off their properties to purchasers who wish to buy
their own home or perhaps use it as their own home. In addition, because
landlords do not get the required return on their investments, properties run
into disrepair. Indeed, Mankeiw cites one economist who described rent control
as “the best way to destroy a city apart from bombing it.”
The U.S. states of Massachusetts and California have abolished or scaled back
their rent control laws but New York is one of the few that hasn’t changed. In an
article in the Boston Globe in April 1997 it was estimated that over two million
people – over a quarter of the New York City’s population – live in apartments
covered by rent control legislation. While the indented effect of rent control was
to help the poor, the unintended effect was that those who occupied rent control
apartments included movie stars, stockbrokers and lawyers, paying a fraction of
the market equilibrium rent. This led the state of New York to pass a law that
became known as the ‘Mia Farrow Law.’ This was reference to the actress who
rented a ten-roomed apartment in Central Park for a fifth of the market rent.
However, the law only lifted rent control for people earning more than $200,000
per annum. The author concludes that, in essence, rent control is a law that few
people and analysts (even liberal ones) support, apart from those, of course, who
get to live in rent controlled apartments.
Water Shortages
Policy makers tend to respond to water shortages by regulation and controls.
Economists favour a market-based solution. One of the unintended
consequences of controls and regulation is that people tend to cheat and increase
their consumption despite the controls. This leads to a form of ‘water policing’
where law enforcement agencies collect names of people suspected of ‘breaking
the law.’
While immediate water shortages are caused by many factors, droughts for
example, the real offender is the regulation that prevents the market forces of
supply and demand for operating. This market solution, favoured by economists,
is a better proposition than ‘water police’ spying on the poor consumer.
Contrary to the view expressed by many regulators, water is not in fixed supply.
The supply of water (like all resources) will change in response to economic
conditions and to the market equilibrium price. For example, the Wall Street
Journal noted that in developing countries the number of people with access to

clean water in 1980 was 44%. In 1994 this had increased to 74% despite
population growth. The reason: increased living standards brought about by
rising real incomes that gave those countries the ability to supply drinking water.
Furthermore, and invoking one of the first principles of economics that people
respond to incentives, the supply of water will increase when people have the
incentive to preserve their use of water. By pricing water, the number of people
wanting to sell (supply) water will exceed the number of people that will want to
buy (demand) water.
The data from around the world shows that when water prices increase by ten
percent water use goes down by twelve percent. If the role of policy makers is to
increase the supply of water, then water must be treated as a commodity and the
market forces of supply and demand will do the rest.
Pollution
Invoking Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market place, i.e.
when households and firms look at prices when deciding what to buy and sell,
they unknowingly take into account the social benefits and costs of their actions.
As a result, prices guide these individual decision makers to reach outcomes that
maximize the welfare of society as a whole. However, even Adam Smith
acknowledged that markets will sometimes fail to allocate resources efficiently
and that sometimes market outcomes are not efficient. The principle reason for
this is what economists describe as ‘externalities.’ If all the costs and benefits of
production are not included in the market price then the market outcome will be
inefficient. For example, if during production, a pharmaceutical company emits
pollution (a social cost) and if this social cost is not included along with all the
explicit costs of production (raw materials, wages, etc), then the market prices
charged will be too low and the output produced too high. Regulators therefore
must find a way of ‘internalizing’ (adding the social cost to the private explicit
cost) this negative externality.
A law that prohibits all pollution would only consider the marginal benefits that
society would receive and would not consider the marginal cost. A law that
prohibits all pollution would actually harm society. Indeed if such a law existed
we would all die because individuals emit greenhouse gases in the form of CO2.
An alternative, favoured by economists, is market based solutions. Market based
solutions provide incentives to polluters to take into account the costs of their
actions and by doing so move market outcomes to efficient outcomes. For
example, suppose two factories, X and Y, each produces 200 tons of waste each
year. The government wants factories to reduce this pollution to, say, 100 tons.
There are three possible solutions to this – one regulatory and two market
based.
In the first instance, the government could command the factories to reduce their
emissions to 100 tons per annum. However, this may not be the most efficient
way to solve the problem because one company, X, could possibly reduce their
pollution at a lower cost than the other company, Y. Forcing both companies to
reduce emissions to the same level may lead to the overall costs being greater
than the benefits.
An alternative to regulation is taxation. Under regulation there is no incentive to
reduce pollution beyond the stated level. Each company will simply reduce their
emissions to the stated amount. Bt taxing pollution an incentive is created to

lower pollution beyond the stated amount. By taxing each ton of pollution,
companies will have the incentive to develop alternative cleaner technologies
and therefore, possibly, reducing their tax liabilities to zero.
A second market-based approach is tradable pollution permits. This is a
mechanism to use property rights and the market to reduce pollution back to an
efficient level. Any polluter that cuts its pollution below the regulated amount
will obtain an emissions reduction credit and this can be sold to another
company who wants to pollute above their level. Suppose that, in our example,
company X wants to increase its pollution by 100 tons and that company Y
agrees to reduce its emissions by 100 tons if factory X agrees to pay it, say, €1m.
In other words the market price of this pollution permit is €1m. Factories that
find it very costly to reduce pollution now have an incentive to research new,
cleaner technologies and therefore spend less on permits. This has the same
outcome as the taxation proposal. The consequence is that regulators
(governments) do not have to find out which factories are most efficient in
reducing pollution – the market forces of supply and demand does this.
Conclusion
Markets are a very efficient way of allocating the world’s scarce resources. The
laws of supply and demand ensure that efficient outcomes are usually
guaranteed. It is also accepted that market outcomes are sometimes inefficient
because of the existence of externalities. How these externalities are internalized
to improve market efficiency is the subject of much debate. The laws passed by
governments with the intended effect of improving market efficiency and equity
are not always in tune with the laws of supply and demand.
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